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An Examination of Non-Linear Relationships between
Intellectual Property Rights Protection and Growth
Brian Lemak

Abstract
This paper examines the possibility of a non-linear
relationship existing between intellectual property rights
protection (IPR) and gross domestic product (GDP) growth
rates. A theoretical justification is developed for the
potential existence of a non-linear relationship in terms of a
quadratic relationship. This is then examined using panel
data from 191 countries and taken in 5 year intervals,
although the data had many missing observations. Results
indicate there is statistically significant evidence that a
quadratic relationship exists between IPR and GDP growth,
however there are reservations about this evidence due to a
dearth of observations in countries with very weak
intellectual property rights protections.
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I. Introduction
The Solow growth model indicates that growth
depends on three factors: capital, labor and technology
growth. Capital and labor are rather simple to define and
measure. The difficulty in properly generating a Solow
growth model lies in modeling technological change. Other
results in the literature, namely Lai (1998), have shown that
using foreign direct investment (FDI) and intellectual
property rights protection (IPR) can serve as good proxy
variables for technology growth. However, these results do
not consider potential non-linear relationships between IPR
and growth.
Taking inspiration from Helpman‘s (1993) NorthSouth model of trade, I propose a new model for looking at
long run growth. Helpman argues that there is an innovating
country in the North and an imitating country in the South
4

and develops a model of trade around this premise. The
Northern country could also be a firm that has some form of
technology and the Southern country could be a firm which
imitates technology, although not necessarily domestic
technology. Applying the model this way, changes in IPR
policy will be seen in GDP growth, with policies where the
benefit to the innovating firm outweighs the cost to the
imitating firms will lead to increases in GDP growth.
Policies where the costs to the imitating firms outweigh the
benefits to the innovating firm will see GDP growth fall, thus
giving two different responses in the growth rate for the
same policy change. As a result, the direct impact of IPR on
growth would have a non-linear impact, quadratic in this
case. This will be discussed in more detail later in the paper.
If this non-linearity truly exists then there are major
policy implications internationally. Simply increasing IPR
will not necessarily lead to more growth. The IPR must be
5

calibrated to be in balance with the needs of the innovating
and imitating firms. This method of calibrating IPR based
on domestic market structure will be more efficient than the
current IPR regimes only if this non-linear relationship
exists. This paper will seek to determine if this non-linear
relationship exists.
In the next section the relevant literature will be
reviewed and their importance to this study will be
discussed. The third section will outline the theoretical
model I will use to determine if this non-linear relationship
exists. The fourth section will discuss the empirical model
that will be used based on conclusions the theoretical model
gives. The fifth section will be devoted to the interpretation
of results. The sixth section will examine statistical critiques
of the model and ensure that the results are statistically
justified which will be followed by the final section where I
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will discuss my conclusions and indicate any avenues for
future research.
II. Literature Review
The article, ―International Trade, Economic Growth
and Intellectual Property Rights: A Panel Data Study of
Developed and Developing Countries,‖ by Patricia Higino
Schneider (2005) investigates an empirical specification that
investigates a relationship closely related to my work.
Schneider‘s purpose for the study was based on the idea that
countries may experience different technological diffusion
based on whether or not they are a developed or a developing
country. If these different diffusion rates exist and have a
large enough impact, it could imply that different types of
countries require different policy regimes to encourage
growth.
Unlike the other papers in the literature, Schneider
uses a much larger set of developing nations in her data.
7

Including these countries should allow for more meaningful
results, as small sample sizes of developing nations could
have lead to bias in earlier work. Schneider uses aggregate
data at the country level, instead of the usual micro-level
models in the literature. While this specification loses some
detail, it allows Schneider the ability to make more
inferences for countries and country groupings. Her results
indicate that separating developed and developing countries
yields different results than specifications which include both
groups together, however I believe that simply correcting for
country-specific omitted variables by using a fixed effects
approach will suffice for my model.
The most shocking result was in regard to the impact
of IPR protection in the split specification using innovation
as the dependent variable. As expected, the coefficient on
IPR protection was positive and significant in the developed
countries model. The results for the developing countries
8

model showed a negative relationship, and in some
specifications this was a significant result. This result would
seem to confirm Schneider‘s hypothesis that there are
different diffusion rates for developed and developing
economies, since the impact of IPR protection is so radically
different. If the diffusion rates were the same, the coefficient
on IPR would be fairly close together. Since Schneider‘s
results have a significant difference between developed and
developing countries, it makes it likely the diffusion rates are
different.
The GDP specification showed little of the
divergence seen in the innovation specification. IPR is only
significant in the regression that includes all countries, and
only when fixed effects are applied, indicating there may be
country-specific omitted variables that need to be corrected.
This does confirm the findings of Gould and Gruben (1996);
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however it seems to contradict the findings in the innovation
specification.
Schnedier‘s conclusions about the divergent results
on the coefficient of IPR are that the innovation that occurs
in developing nations may be more directly related to other
technologies than what occurs in developed nations. If this
is true, then increasing IPR protections would stifle
innovation in developing nations, and provide an adversarial
relationship between firms in developed versus developing
economies. This is similar to the reasoning I have used in
my North-South adaptation which will be discussed in
greater detail in the next section.
The article ―Intellectual Property Rights and
Economic Growth,‖ by Rod Falvey, Neil Foster and David
Greenaway (2006) investigates the impact of IPR on
economic growth in a panel data using 79 countries and
threshold regression techniques. Their results indicate that
10

the relationship between IPR and growth depends on the
initial level of GDP in a non-linear fashion. They make
special note that in no case did increased IPR protection lead
to negative growth, so there are no real changes for policy
recommendations. They found that there is no impact for
middle income countries but high and low income countries
experience positive effects from increasing IPR. The authors
theorize this may be due to middle income countries being
more likely to engage in imitation. However, this makes
little sense to me since it is even more likely that low income
countries would engage in imitation, since middle income
countries would be engaging in imitation because they can
gain net utility from the imitation of outside innovation. It
stands to reason that low income countries could get the
similar utility from imitation, but the results indicate this is
not true.

11

The authors argue that simply squaring IPR or
creating an interaction term between IPR and initial GDP is
not sufficient. They base this argument off of results
obtained, indicating that the coefficient estimates on these
variables were not significant. However, this conclusion was
based on results from a smaller dataset than I plan on using.
The threshold model works quite well, however I think the
authors may have been able to find success with the much
simpler specification.
The article ―Patent Rights and Innovative Activity:
evidence from national and firm-level data,‖ by Brent B.
Allred and Walter G. Park (2007) investigates the impact of
IPR on innovation. The authors find that significant nonlinear relationships exist, however care must be taken in
applying these results to this paper. This paper dealt with the
impact of IPR on innovation and while innovation clearly
has an impact on GDP, there is no guarantee that IPR will
12

display the same non-linear relationships when growth is the
dependent variable instead of innovation.
There is a theoretical reason to believe the
relationship should carry through. According to the authors
patent filings are dependent on IPR and IPR squared in
addition to other variables. Suppose, instead of foreign
direct investment (FDI) and IPR, these proxies for
technology growth were replaced with patent filings. Then
the model will still have IPR in it and because IPR are in the
equation in both linear and non-linear form, the model would
also have IPR in linear and non-linear form after
substitution. Thus, the model specification with both IPR
and IPR squared is theoretically justified from the results of
Allred and Park, since they showed the existence of nonlinear relationships when innovation is used as the dependent
variable.

13

The article ―International Intellectual Property Rights
Protection and the Rate of Product Innovation,‖ by Edwin
L.-C. Lai (1998) investigates the impact of FDI and IPR on a
country‘s innovation rate in a theoretical manner. Lai‘s
results lead to a number of theorems which are quite relevant
to this research mainly that stronger IPR will lead to lower
innovation and a lower wage rate of the South relative to the
North, provided that imitation is the main source of
innovation for the South. If this is not the case and so-called
―multinationalization‖ is the main source of growth, stronger
IPR will lead to higher innovation and a higher wage rate of
the South relative to the North. This is the theoretical reason
this ―multinationalization‖ concept must be accounted for,
which will be included in the model via the FDI variable.
This gives the ability to control for countries where imitation
is the main source of growth and for countries where
multinationalization is the source of growth.
14

III. Theoretical Methodology
Before developing the empirical model for this paper,
stronger justification at the theoretical level is needed.
Consider a country with two types of firms, innovating firms
which create their own intellectual property and imitating
firms which do not create their own intellectual property, but
use intellectual property developed by others either
domestically or internationally. This is similar to the model
of trade developed by Helpman (1993), however in this case
the trade is applied to the domestic economy and there is
some distribution of innovating and imitating firms at the
domestic level. Now, suppose that the government decides
to increase IPR, holding everything else constant. Firms are
now faced with a decision to innovate or imitate. The
increase in IPR makes it easier for innovating firms to
recoup innovation investment costs, thus making more
innovation activity viable. The innovating firms will choose
15

to innovate and the imitating firms will choose to imitate the
technology that comes from innovating firms. The
innovating firms‘ innovation will lead to new technologies
emerging and as imitating firms adopt those technologies
productivity increases and as a result GDP growth increases.
However, with stronger IPR in place, it is more likely
that the imitating firms can be taken to civil court for an
intellectual property violation. As a result, the diffusion of
technology to other firms will slow out of concern about
lawsuits and/or fighting any IP infringement lawsuits. The
legal profession is one where no generally applicable
innovation occurs. New legal arguments and new laws can
come from the legal area, but legal firms getting more
revenue and higher profits will not lead to the same
productivity growth as technological diffusion does. If IPR
increases continue, the likelihood of an imitating firm being
taken to court for IP violations will approach 1. As a result,
16

the diffusion of new technology will slow even further,
preventing any growth in productivity and thus allowing
GDP growth to stagnate.
However, if no IPR exist there will be no incentive
for innovating firms to innovate since they will have no
ability to make up the research costs. As a result, no
technology can be created to diffuse to the imitating firms
and GDP growth will stagnate. This setup indicates that
there must be some point between no IPR and ―infinite‖ IPR
where the GDP growth rate is maximized. An actual
prediction for this maximization point would require
information about firms‘ decision strategies, a true measure
of lawsuit likelihood and other variables that are not
available empirically. However, this model would indicate
that the relationship between IPR and GDP growth is not
entirely linear. The simplest non-linear model would be a
model where GDP growth was impacted by IPR in a
17

negative quadratic fashion. This would give some
maximization point between no IPR and ―infinite‖ IPR and
also allow for stagnant growth at very extreme values of IPR.
As a result, an empirical model which showed the existence
of a negative quadratic relationship between GDP growth
and IPR would be evidence supporting the validity of this
theoretical model. Additional ways of testing this could be
by looking at patent rate or the allocation of resources
between production, innovation and bureaucracy. These are
somewhat more complex than looking at GDP growth rates,
but should also show some sort of non-linear relationship
with IPR. The remainder of this paper will focus on an
investigation of the GDP growth rate empirical model.
IV. Empirical Methodology
The model for this paper will help determine if a
significant non-linearity exists in the relationship between
GDP growth and IPR. Evidence that would help to prove
18

this would be regression results which show a coefficient
estimate that is statistically significant in difference from 0.
I hypothesize this coefficient will be negative due to the
theoretical ramifications of a negative coefficient. Namely,
it would imply that there can be deleterious effects from
having an IPR regime that is too strict. Contradicting
evidence would be a coefficient that is not statistically
significant in difference from 0.
A properly specified model is needed to test this
hypothesis. Clearly, GDP growth will be the dependent
variable and IPR squared will be an independent variable.
Neither of these variables have any units associated with
them, since IPR is an index and GDP growth will be
measured by the natural log of GDP, which lacks any units.
Beyond that relevant theory must drive model construction.
The first variable to add is IPR. IPR squared is already
included, but to ensure the full effect of IPR is included, IPR
19

should be included. Based on Lai (1998), a term that can
account for multinationalization is needed. Foreign direct
investment (FDI) will account for this potential relationship;
however the natural log of this variable will be used due to
FDI being measured in dollars, since the dependent variable
is a unit-less variable.
The remainder of the model will stem directly from
the traditional Solow growth model. An assumption that
labor force participation is constant over the long-run is
sensible here, so there is no need to include any variables
related to employment. However, human and physical
capital stocks are not static. To account for changes in
capital I will use the fact that capital divided by GDP will be
proportional to the investment rate in the long-run. Thus, the
ratio of investment spending to total GDP as our measure of
the investment rate will be used. The benefit of this
measurement is it has already removed units from
20

consideration, so there is no need for any further
modifications to the variable. This still leaves human capital
stock unaccounted for so a measure of educational
achievement will be included to control for human capital
effects. Specifically some measurement of enrollment rates
or a comparable statistic will be used. This again will not
have any units, so no further transformation is needed.
Finally, the current level of real GDP per capita will be used
to control for any differences in growth due to convergence
effects. The model is thus:
pcgrowthti=β0+ β1(investratioti)+ β2(enrollti)+
β3(Ln(FDIti))+ β4(IPRti)+ β5(IPR2ti)+ β6(Ln(rGDPti)
However, it is possible that the impact of IPR on growth is
not immediately felt. As a result, a second specification will
be run with values of IPR and IPR2 lagged one period. I
expect the coefficients on all variables but IPR2 and
Ln(rGDP) to be positive in both specifications. I expect a
21

negative coefficient on IPR2 because it would be consistent
with the non-linearity that I outlined in the previous section.
The negative expected coefficient on Ln(rGDP) comes from
the fact that the Solow model predicts that wealthier
countries will grow slower than poorer countries, everything
else being equal.
V. Data
Ideally data for this study would be a yearly measure
of all the above variables from every country starting at
around 1960 and progressing to the present day with no
missing observations. Unfortunately, this type of data is not
available. Thus, data from every 5 years will be used due to
the only reliable dataset for IPR (the Park-Ginarte dataset)
only having 5 year increments available. Additionally, there
is no data for enrollment rates that dates back far enough for
the purposes of this study. Primary school completion rates
from the World Development Index will be used as a proxy
22

for enrollment as this data does go back for a few decades.
Unfortunately, there are a large number of missing
observations due to countries not reporting. Since this is the
only viable measure of human capital for this type of study,
there are no options other than using this data while being
wary of potential issues. Specifically, only around 600
observations for primary school completion exist while the
measurement of IPR and other variables have over a
thousand observations, although these datasets are also
incomplete.
There is still another problem with the data. The
2005 values for IPR were collected by the International
Property Rights Index with help from one of the authors of
the Park-Ginarte dataset. Unfortunately, this data was an
index from 0 to 10 while the previous values were an index
from 0 to 5. I corrected this by dividing all the 2005 values
by 2, but this difference in measurement could result in some
23

measurement error. More importantly, the IPR data is an
index which has dubious statistical qualities. This could
induce some level of measurement error, but similar to the
issue with human capital data there is no viable alternative.
The values for percent growth rate, investment ratio and
initial real GDP all come from the Penn World Tables
version 6.3. The values for FDI and primary school
completion rate come from the World Bank Human
Development Indicators. All the values for IPR, except for
the 2005 values which were discussed earlier, come from the
Park-Ginarte dataset. The dataset covers a total of 191
countries. Table 1 provides further details on the general
statistics of the variables in the model.
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Table 1 Summary Statistics
Variable
pcgrowth
investratio
ln(fdi)
completion
ipr
ipr2
ln(rgdp)

Observations
1426

Mean
7.165795

Std. Dev.
7.625921

1614
681
1026
1109
1109
1614

.2100859
74.80013
18.35626
2.484707
6.938425
7.794784

.130203
28.03788
2.934997
.8748409
4.282599
1.355245

Min
18.00167
.0116
3.976747
9.21034
0
0
4.511518

Max
106.717
1.0492
138.1592
26.49556
5
25
11.19713

These missing observations could play a large role in the
ability to determine the validity of the hypothesis. By having
so many missing observations, the sample size is drastically
decreased. This increases the likelihood of a nonrepresentative sample and will also inflate the standard
errors. As a result of this, vigilance is needed when
observing standard errors. The issue of potential
measurement error in IPR is a more distressing problem, as
this will bias our estimates and change our standard errors.
Fortunately, the errors related to the 2005 sample can be
removed by simply removing the 2005 sample. This is not
25

the best solution, however if the errors prove to be large
enough to bias results it is a remedy available.
VI. Results
Table 2 Regression output
Standard fixed effects
model results
(t-statistics)
Investratio
35.9561***
(5.73)
Completion
-.071811**
(-2.17)
Ln(fdi)
.6962578***
(3.16)
IPR
2.145613
(0.97)
IPR2
-.9584257**
(-2.19)
Ln(rgdp)
-3.162094***
(-3.76)
constant
19.39636
(3.47)
Lag(IPR)
Lag(IPR2)

Observations

Lagged fixed effects
model results
(t-statistics)
37.99499***
(6.55)
-.0578015*
(-1.80)
.5503132**
(2.49)

-3.431289***
(-3.85)
21.86361
(3.34)
1.106924
(0.41)
-.4786142
(-0.92)

430

421

R2

.2966

.2775

Prob>F

0.000

0.001

* statistically significant in difference from 0 at the .1 level
** statistically significant in difference from 0 at the .05 level
*** statistically significant in difference from 0 at the .01 level
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For the standard fixed effects model, the coefficient
estimate on investment ratio indicates that a change of .1 in
the investment ratio will increase the growth rate of GDP by
3.595 percentage points, holding constant the influence of
the other included variables. The p-value associated with
this estimate (0.000) indicates that one rejects the null
hypothesis that the coefficient estimate is 0. This coefficient
estimate is statistically significant in difference from 0.
The coefficient estimate on primary school
completion rate indicates that a change of 1 will decrease
growth by .072 percentage points, holding constant the
influence of the other included variables. The p-value
associated with this estimate (0.031) indicates that one
rejects the null hypothesis that the coefficient estimate is 0.
This coefficient estimate is statistically significant in
difference from 0.
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The coefficient estimate on ln(FDI) indicates that a
change of 1 in the natural log of FDI will increase growth by
.696 percentage points, holding constant the impact of the
other included variables. The p-value associated with this
estimate (0.002) indicates that one rejects the null hypothesis
that the coefficient estimate is 0. This coefficient estimate is
statistically significant in difference from 0.
The coefficient estimate on IPR indicates that a 1
point change in IPR will increase GDP growth by 2.146
percentage points, holding constant the impact of the other
included variables. The p-value associated with this estimate
(0.334) indicates that one fails to reject the null hypothesis
that the coefficient estimate is 0. This coefficient estimate is
not statistically significant in difference from 0.
The coefficient estimate on IPR2 indicates that a 1
point change in IPR will decrease growth by .958 percentage
points, holding constant the impact of the other included
28

variables. The p-value associated with this estimate (0.029)
indicates that one rejects the null hypothesis that the
coefficient estimate is 0. This coefficient estimate is
statistically significant in difference from 0.
The model‘s R2 value indicates that approximately
30% of the variation in the growth rate of GDP can be
explained by the variation in the independent variables. The
Prob>F value (0.000) indicates that one rejects the null
hypothesis that the coefficients on all included variables is 0.
Generally speaking, the results for the standard
model were in line with expectations. With the exception of
completion rate all coefficient estimates had proper signage.
However, the negative coefficient on completion rate does
have an economic explanation. The coefficient estimate on
ln(rGDP) was negative and statistically significant in
difference from 0. This would indicate that wealthier
countries grow slower, everything else in the model being
29

held constant. However, wealthier countries are more likely
to have a high rate of primary school completion. Thus, the
negative statistically significant in difference from 0
coefficient estimate is due to the wealthier countries growing
slower and having a higher primary school completion rate.
These results do indicate there is a statistically
significant in difference from 0 squared relationship between
IPR and growth rate. This gives some weight to the
argument that there is a non-linear relationship between IPR
and growth rate, but caution must be exercised. Figure 1
indicates that very few countries have extremely weak
intellectual property rights regimes. As a result, any
inference about the impact of IPR on growth rates when IPR
is less than 1 must be taken with a grain of salt. It is for this
reason that caution is needed when discussing the existence
of non-linear relationships between IPR and growth.
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Neither of the IPR variables in the lagged model was
statistically significant in difference from 0 at the .1, .05 or
.01 confidence levels. This would indicate that, despite
some theoretical backing, past values of IPR do not have an
impact on growth rates today. This is a rather curious result
and warrants further investigation.
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VII. Empirical Model Critique
Table 3 Correlation Coefficients
investrati completio
o
n
investratio
completio
n
lnfdi

1.0000
0.5307

1.0000

0.3147

0.5853

ipr

0.2132

0.3089

ipr2

0.2420

0.3214

lnrgdp

0.5236

0.7729

lnfdi

ipr

ipr2

lnrgdp

1.000
0
0.351
2
0.409
9
0.727
6

1.000
0
0.966
2
0.459
0

1.000
0
0.504
4

1.000
0

There is little theoretical reason to believe any of
these variables, save IPR IPR2, and ln(rGDP) should exhibit
any multicollinearity. A correlation study, seen in Table 3,
indicated there was no significant correlation between any of
the independent variables except those noted earlier,
confirming this belief. The multicollinearity associated with
ln(rGDP) is somewhat worrying, however the standard errors
were low enough and the inclusion of ln(rGDP) important
enough that correcting for the multicollinearity will hurt the
32

theoretical strength of the model. As a result, no action was
taken to correct for multicollinearity. The standard errors are
very close to normally distributed as seen in Figure 1.
Additionally, there appears to be no evidence of any serious
serial autocorrelation or heteroskedasticity as seen in Figures
2 and 3 respectively. As a result, no correction was made
due to the relatively small impact these statistical problems
could have on the model.

0
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Figure 2 Histogram of Errors
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The question of the model having possible
measurement error issue is a valid one, considering that
countries may have outright lied or ―massaged‖ numbers
when surveyed by the publishers of this data. However, if
there is any measurement error which truly biases the model
it would have to exist over multiple decades (and multiple
government regimes) and multiple countries. This is fairly
unlikely simply because of the mathematical implications of
basic probability theory. If one assumes that one country has
a 50% chance to lie during data collection in one period, the
combined probability of even ten of the observations being
lies is quite low (less than .1%). Additionally, even if a large
set of countries did lie, they would also probably have lied in
other surveys, making any kind of correction by using a
proxy variable rather difficult. As a result, though
measurement error could exist, this model will not account
35

for it because of the low likelihood it exists and the difficulty
of correction if it does exist.
Endogeneity was considered as another possible issue
but at the theoretical level it does not make much sense. If
endogeneity did exist it would say that growth rate dictates
IPR policy, but because growth rate is highly variable, with a
standard deviation of 7.63 and a mean of 7.17 (see table 1),
policy makers would be constantly adjusting IPR. As a
result IPR would also be highly varied. It is not possible to
say how exactly the relationship worked, but if growth rates
have high variability and determine IPR, then IPR should
also have a fairly high variability. This does not fit with the
basic summary statistics for IPR as IPR has a standard
deviation of .87 and a mean of 2.48. If growth rates were
truly determining IPR, IPR should be highly varied like
growth rates are, with a standard deviation fairly close to the
mean. But there is a much larger gap between the mean of
36

IPR and the standard deviation of IPR then is seen with
growth rate, which would confirm this theoretical argument
for endogeneity not being an issue.

VIII. Conclusion
To conduct this study I used panel data from a
number of sources and a model that included IPR, IPR2,
Ln(FDI), investment ratio, Ln(rGDP) and primary school
completion rate. There was some concern about potential
measurement errors in IPR due to IPR being an index from 0
to 5; however there was no real solution as the dataset in this
paper is the best dataset available for measuring IPR.
Additional concerns were raised about missing observations
in both IPR and primary school completion rate. Primary
school completion rate was used because no enrollment rate
variables had the necessary time scale that was needed for
this study. Similar to the concerns about measurement error
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in IPR, there was no real solution to the concerns about
missing observations in the variables as no alternative was
available.
The results did show statistically significant in
difference from 0 evidence of a quadratic relationship
between IPR and GDP growth. Care must be taken in
interpreting this as evidence of a non-linearity existing
because of a dearth of observations where IPR was less than
1. Other results confirming this relationship would allow for
more confidence in stating a non-linear relationship between
IPR and GDP growth exists. Additionally, there was a
statistically significant in difference from 0 negative
coefficient on completion rate. This makes theoretical sense,
despite contradicting a priori expectations, since wealthier
countries are more likely to grow slower and more likely to
have a high completion rate.
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Future studies should attempt to replicate these
results and determine if these results are valid. Results
which can confirm this relationship would make arguments
for the existence of non-linearities much stronger.
Additional studies may also want to look at alternate
specifications since the lagged specification did not show
any statistically significant from 0 relationship between IPR
and growth despite having a fairly strong theoretical basis.
Future work may also want to investigate the other empirical
ways of proving IPR works on the economy in a non-linear
fashion which were mentioned in the theoretical
methodology section. Specifically, the impact IPR will have
on patent rates or the impact IPR will have on distribution of
resources between production, innovation and bureaucracy.
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Globalization and Economic Growth
in Sub-Saharan Africa
Hadiatou Barry1

Abstract
This study analyzes Sub-Saharan Africa through the
framework of globalization. The study‘s objective is to determine
whether globalization is a significant factor when associated with
economic growth in the region. Using panel data from 1995-2005
for 41 countries and the KOF globalization index, an Ordinary
Least Squares (OLS) model was employed to examine the
relationship between globalization and other traditional factors of
economic growth such as trade, foreign direct investment, loans,
aid, natural resources, corruption, and rule of law. The study
shows that globalization has a positive, though statistically
insignificant impact on the economic growth of Sub-Saharan
Africa. However, globalization is positive and statistically
significant for countries with scarce natural resources. I interpret
these results as proving that the leading causes of slow economic
growth in Sub-Saharan African countries is due to heavy
dependence on natural resources, low investment in human capital,
and the negligence of other industries—all of which suggest that
these countries are unable to effectively manage critical processes
of globalization. Indeed, in order to reap the net benefits of
globalization, I argue, African countries need to work towards
economic stability by developing better macroeconomic policies
for their future.
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Introduction
In this new era of international interdependency and
interaction called globalization, there has been much
controversy over the benefits of globalization to developing
countries, especially to African nations. The issue of
globalization is especially important considering the history
of sub-Saharan Africa. With the exception of Liberia and
Ethiopia, most of the region has been colonized at some
point in its history. During the mid-twentieth century, for
example, both the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and
the World Bank imposed neoclassical economic policies,
such as Structural Adjustment Programs (SAPs), on SubSaharan Africa in the hopes of opening up and integrating it
into the global market (Schneider, 2003; Ajayi, 2003;
Dreher, 2006). Neoclassical economic policies are
associated with pro-market liberalization of trade, capital
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control and labor markets, reductions of all kinds of state
regulation, and privatization of state-owned enterprises.
There are many findings that suggest these SAPs
were more harmful to these nations than beneficial. But other
scholars have concluded that SAPs did not have such a
detrimental effect. Meagher (2003) articulated this point in
her analysis of globalization and trade in West Africa, stating
that ―instead of disappearing into the face of structural
adjustment and globalization, West Africa‘s trans-border
trade systems have been restructured and globalized.‖ Yet,
where the presence of globalization has not always been in
the best interest of the local communities, the paradox is that
African leaders themselves welcome the opportunity to
promote globalization (Otenyo, 2004). Where SAPs did not
benefit African nations, they did stimulate trans-border trade
by enforcing the global policy framework of deregulation
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and privatization of government enterprises and by helping
to improve trade in communication and technologies.
This paper studies the aggregate impact of
globalization on the economic growth of Sub-Saharan
Africa, using the traditional neoclassical growth model, with
panel data from 1995 to 2005 and for 41 African countries.2
The decade 1995 to 2005 is important because African
nations had enough time to recover from SAPs and pursue
policies that could enable them to embrace the process of
globalization.
I utilized the Ordinary Least Square (OLS) estimation
to analyze this panel data, controlling for countries‘
characteristics by including dummy variables. Previous
studies of globalization and economic growths used proxy
variables such as trade, which by itself is not of the best
variable, to determine how globalized a particular economy
2
I wanted to use data for all of Sub-Sahara Africa, but due to the lack
of data for the variables employed in this paper, I was limited to 41 countries.
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might be. I used the KOF globalization index to measure
globalization. The KOF index measures nations‘ overall
integration into the global economy. According to the KOF
index of globalization, globalization is defined as the process
of creating networks of connections among actors at multicontinental distances, mediated through a variety of flows,
including people, information and ideas, and capital and
goods, while eroding national boundaries, integrating
national economies, cultures, technologies and governance.
Along with other traditional measures of economic growth
that are often utilized in other studies—these range from
foreign aid to foreign direct investment (FDI), investment in
human capital, trade, and corruption, just to name few—this
study used the OLS method to determine whether
globalization impacts economic growth in Africa. Following
this method, I measured whether globalization is a
significant and positive factor to the economic growth of
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African nations. Furthermore, I attempt to explain how
African nations can benefit economically from globalization
in ways similar to other regions of the world such as Asia
and the Middle East, which are growing economically at a
faster rate than Africa.
The contribution of this study to globalization
literature is that it underlines the reality that globalization is
not a statistically significant contributor to the economic
growth of countries with abundant natural resources. It also
highlights the fact that, on the other hand, globalization is
significantly important for small countries, especially those
countries with ―scarce‖ natural resources. Indeed, when
managed systematically in the proper context, globalization
can have a positive and significant contribution to economic
growth of Sub-Saharan Africa. For one, nations that are
highly globalized tended to be less corrupt than less
globalized ones. And nations that are less corrupt tend to
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have high economic growth. The empirical findings from
this study underscore that globalization has a positive
contribution to economic growth of Sub-Saharan Africa
generally, but that its contribution is not statistically
significant.
The rest of this paper is organized as follow. Section
I provides literature reviews. Section II provides the methods
used to conduct this study: an empirical OLS estimate
regression model on globalization. Section III presents the
estimation results of the simple multiple regression models.
Section IV provides discussion and interpretation of these
results. Section V draws conclusions and makes some policy
recommendations about how to improve globalization in
order to benefit Africa, and explores areas for further
research.
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I.

Literature review

Researchers have long been interested in determining
the factors of economic growth in Sub-Saharan Africa and
how globalization affects growth. Some scholars have
argued that the overall effect of globalization is positive for
developing countries whether by trans-border or
international integration (Meagher, 2003; Otenyo, 2004;
Schneider, 2003). The ratio of extra-regional trade to GDP in
Africa is twice that of Latin America and nearly four times
that of Europe (Schenider, 2003). The global community is
pushing toward a rapid and sustainable development, thus
pressing African nations even more toward openness and
globalization. Due to this push, African nations are relatively
open and globalized. Schneider (2003) argued that
globalization is not a new phenomenon in Africa: Africa
began to be integrated into the global economy in the
sixteenth century, and this integration has continued,
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although unevenly, since that time. Furthermore, African
countries are also linked directly to their former colonial
powers, who often are their largest trading partners.
On the contrary, other scholars maintain that African
nations do not have the potential to effectively integrate into
the global economy. A major concern is that while other
emerging market economies have benefited from
globalization, African countries continue to be marginalized
(Oshikoya, 2008). Meagher (2003) concluded in her study
that globalization, for example, tended to stimulate rather
than eliminate illegal and counterproductive activities across
Africa. She points out that, as a direct result of unstable and
short-sighted political and macroeconomic policies, Africa is
mismanaging globalization rather than capializing on the net
benefit of globalization. In addition, Africa does not have an
adequate political and economic infrastructure to effectively
manage globalization, therefore reinforcing its global
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position as economically disadvantaged. These scholars
would probably agree that globalization is taking advantage
of Africa and that it is not a reciprocal relationship in terms
of the benefit gained from globalization.
The benefits of globalization can accrue to Africa if
governments take advantages of the following channels of
globalization: trade, capital flows, migration,
communication, and technologies (Ajayi, 2003). Indeed, if
managed correctly, the benefit to Africa of globalization can
be significant. Africa can diversify its exports, so that instead
of exporting only minerals or primary commodities,
globalization would allow it to generate exports developed
through new or less active industries. For example, with
improved communication and technology, Africa can expand
its manufacturing industries thereby attracting foreign
capital, which in turn can bring in new ideas and new
technology (Ajayi, 2003). Against the backdrop of increased
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trade and investment, economic growth is the only way to
develop because it can reduce a country‘s level of poverty
and increase the standard of living. Of course, the benefit
derived by each African nation will be different because of
different characteristics such as the level of education, the
available natural resources, infrastructural development, and
political stability, all of which can be greatly improved by
globalization.
African governments want to benefit from
globalization in the sense that they too advocate for
globalization. The desire to embrace the potential benefits of
interconnectedness remains strong in most governments of
the developing world (Otenyo, 2004). Indeed, many
economists agree that the route to the global economy
remains straightforward, most pointedly, as noted above,
through trade and investments. Yet Africa‘s entry into the
global markets is complicated by its poverty, debts, and great
52

dependence on natural resources. Necessary steps must be
taken in order for Africa to benefit from globalization.
African governments are involved in managing natural
resources instead of globalization. According to Otenyo
(2004), data shows that since 1996, following the emergence
of rapid globalization, East African city governments has
become increasingly positive, leading to the conclusion that
globalization can even positively reform how nations govern
themselves. This and other studies shed light on the concrete
benefits of globalization in Sub-Saharan Africa.
II.

Method—an empirical model of economic growth
This study uses panel data for 41 Sub-Saharan

African countries covering the period 1995 to 2005 on
globalization and other traditional factors of economic
growth. A total of 11 independent variables are used in this
study. The model used in this paper is the classical
regression model, the Ordinary Least Square (OLS)
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Regression, under the Gaus-Markov assumptions. The model
is specified as:
Log GDP = β0 + β1aid + β2loans + β3FDI + β4export +
β5import + β6rulelaw + β7humancap +
β8naturalresources + β9 Global index + B10LagGDP +
B11Corrupt + ϵ
(1)
The model passed the Ramsey test which tests for
omitted variable bias (p-value 0.61). I also ran a Variance
Inflation Factors (Vif) to identify the problem of
multicollinearity. The test shows that we do not have the
problem of multicollinearity, meaning that the independent
variables are not correlated with one another since the mean
vif is 2.58; all the variables have a vif less than 10. Also, I
tested for heteroskedasticity to ensure that the standard errors
of the estimates are not biased. The standard errors must be
constant. Homoskedasticity implies that the conditional on
54

the explanatory variables, i.e. the variance of the unobserved
error, ϵ, was constant. Using the Pagan test, I failed to reject
the null hypothesis (p-value 0.0596). Therefore, there is no
problem of heteroskedasticity.
The dependent variable used to capture economic
growth is log Gross Domestic Product (GDP). GDP is the
most important variable in studying economic growth. The
log GDP is taken for simplicity of description and
interpretation of results. The independent variables used in
the model are described as follows.
―Aid per capita,‖ measured by both official
development assistance and official aid, is used to capture
the impact of an external source of capital on economic
growth. Scholars who advocate for aid argue that foreign
capital flows are necessary for the economic growth of
developing countries (Fayissa and Nsiah, 2008).
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―Loans per capita‖ are measured in terms of IBRD
loans and IDA credit extended by the World Bank Group to
developing countries. Loans are also used to capture their
effect on economic growth. Many studies find that loans are
negatively correlated with economic growth in Sub-Saharan
Africa, adversely affecting the economic growth.
―Foreign Direct Investment‖ (FDI) measured as a
percentage of GDP, is the net inflow of foreign enterprise
operating in an economy other than that of the investor. FDI
is used here to capture the effect of the outside source of
capital on economic growth of developing nations. There are
controversies over the benefit of foreign direct investment in
Africa.
―Export‖ and ―Import‖. The term of trade measured
as export plus import divided by GDP. Trade is another
variable that determines how open an economy is to the
global market. In this model, I separated export from import
56

to determine their impact separately on economic growth.
Ajayi (2003) mentioned that trade liberalization has been
shown to be associated with increased export orientation and
higher rate. However, this has not been the case for Africa;
rather, most African nations have seen an increase in import
instead of export.
―Rule of law‖ and ―corruption‖ measured the
accountability of government officials. The promotion of the
rule of law throughout Africa is lacking. African nations are
among the lowest ranking on the rule of law index. The
Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) measures the perceived
level of public-sector corruption taken from Transparency
International.
―Net enrollment/attendance rates in primary school‖
are used as a proxy to capture the investment in human
capital. Investment in human capital is a significant factor of
economic growth in many other regions. The people of
57

Africa experience lower levels of education than those in
other regions of the world, which reflects the lower level of
economic development in Africa. As Schultz (1999) argued,
Africa also has some of the lowest levels of schooling in the
world, and the relative quality of schooling still remains to
be evaluated. Thus, I expect education to become even more
critical to the economic progress.
―Natural resources‖ are measured as the percentage
of export that is each country‘s main mineral commodities.
Sachs and Warner (1997) pointed out that one of the
surprising features of modern economic growth is that
economies abundant in natural resources have tended to
grow slower than economies without substantial natural
resources. They conclude that high resource wealth has
encouraged developing countries to pursue protectionist,
state-led development strategies, as they try to combat the
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natural resource curse or Dutch Disease3 effect of the
resources‘ abundance. In addition, they argued that this
inward-looking approach to development may result in lower
investment rates and/or lower growth rate directly.
―The Globalization index‖ measures how countries
are economically, politically, and socially integrated. The
sub-indexes of globalization are strongly related to each
other, so including them separately in a regression induces
collinearity problems. The Globalization index is used to
capture the long distance flow of goods, capital, and services
and diffusion of government policies and the spread of ideas,
information, and people.

3

The Dutch disease is a theory that explains that countries that are
wealthy in natural resources tend to have a decrease in manufacturing industries
causing them to become less competitive because they neglect those industries—
manufacturing or agriculture in the case of Africa. Indeed, manufacturing and
agriculture are essential to a country‘s economic growth.
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―The lagGDP‖ is also included to measure the effect
of past GDP. In most countries, past performance has an
effect on future economic growth.
All variables, except rule of law, corruption and
natural resources, are in current US$. A group of country
dummies are included to control for the effect of different
countries‘ characteristics because the effect of all factors
vary across countries but not so much over time, since only a
decade is used in this model.
Data is from various sources. GDP, aid per capital,
loans, FDI, and trade (export and import) are taken from the
World Bank Development Indicators. While the
Globalization index is taken from the KOF index
Globalization, net enrollment/attendance rates are taken from
United Nations Data, mineral commodities from U.S.
Geological Survey, Rule of Law index is from the

60

Worldwide Governance Indicators, and the corruption index
is taken from Transparency International.
III.

Results
Table 4 in the appendix provides a summary of the

variables used in this study. The OLS estimates used in the
model are provided below:
Log GDP = 0.1901226 + 0.0003689aid
± 0.0001656loans ± 0.0011973β3FDI
± 0.000000249export + 0.0001704import
+ 0.0410666rulelaw
+ 0.0007122humancap
+ 0.0002286naturalresources
+ 0.000702 Global index
+ 0.9964942LagGDP ± 0.0276172Corrupt
+ϵ
(2)
The results from the model used here indicate that
this study is consistent with other economic studies of
economic growth. The result for globalization index
indicates that globalization has a positive coefficient
(0.000702), but a statistically insignificant effect (p=0.477)
on the economic growth in Sub-Saharan Africa. This is
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consistent with the findings of other studies, which have
established that globalization is not fully grasped by all of
Africa. This suggests that globalization is important for
economic growth in Africa but is performing below its
potential. Otenyo (2004) argues that one positive effect of
globalization is the drive toward greater decentralization and
openness. But African nations with large amounts of natural
resources tend to lean toward protectiveness, which results in
a slower growth rate.
I tested whether the globalization index has different
effects in countries that have large amounts of natural
resources in comparison to countries that do not. I ran a
regression with economic growth measured here by log GDP
of year one minus log GDP of year two against lag trade,
which is the past term of trade, and lag global, which is the
past globalization index. I created a dummy variable with
countries that export 40 percent or greater of their natural
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resources in comparison with countries that export less than
40 percent of their natural resources. I also used the fixed
effect for this model. The results show (see table 3) that in
countries with a large amount of natural resources,
globalization is not statistically significant (p-value=0.73) to
economic growth. But in countries with less than 40 percent
of natural resources, globalization is statistically significant
(p-value=0.011) to economic growth. This suggests that
globalization is statistically significant for economic growth
in countries with ―scarce‖ natural resources; but in countries
abundant in natural resources, globalization is positive, but
statistically insignificant.
The result for foreign aid has a positive coefficient
(0.0003689) and is statistically significant for economic
growth (p=0.005) of African countries. A dollar increase in
aid per capita will increase GDP by .0369 percent. Among
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scholars, aid is one of the major conventional investments
that are deemed to foster economic growth (Papanek, 1973).
The coefficient for loans is negative (-0.0001656)
and p-value (0.129). This means that there is a negative
relationship between loans and economic growth, but it is
statistically insignificant. Many other scholars such as
Dreher (2006) have demonstrated that there is a negative
relationship between loans and economic growth. This
relationship is due to the fact that loans often lead to debt.
This study provides further proof of this.
The results showed negative coefficient (-0.0011973)
between foreign direct investments (FDI) and economic
growth and statistically insignificant (p-value 0.083) at the
5% level, controlling for all other variables. According to
Asiedu (2005), among developing countries as a whole, FDI
flows have increased from 17 percent in the second half of
1980s to 32 percent in 1992, but the share of Sub-Saharan
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Africa is now below 1 percent and falling. Asiedu (2005)
also mentioned that an increase in FDI does not necessarily
imply higher economic growth. Indeed, the empirical
relationship between FDI and growth is unclear.
In this model, I separated imports from exports
because I wanted to understand their respective effects on
economic growth. The terms of trade as percentage of GDP
was negative to economic growth, this is often due to trade
deficits. Many African countries have a negative trade deficit
because they import much more than they export. Hence, the
negative relationship between the terms of trade and
economic growth. Most countries export only primary
commodities or natural resources. The result from this study
shows that there is a negative coefficient (-0.000000249)
between import and economic growth, but not statistically
significant (p-value 0.996) at the 5 percent level. There is a
positive coefficient (0.0001704) between economic growth
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and exports, but it is statistically insignificant (p-value
0.716). This is what I expected and is consistent with other
studies. According to Meagher (2003), Africa‘s share in
world export flow has fallen, particularly in manufacturing,
which is the key growth sector for the expansion of trade and
resource flows in the context of globalization. In addition,
Meagher (2003) concludes that in the face of declining
exports and international investment Africa has fallen far
behind in the development of the appropriate infrastructure,
technology and skills to link up with the information
revolution, which is central to the global restructuring of
production, trade, and finance.
The rule of law coefficient is positive (0.0410666)
and statistically significant (p-value 0.011) at the 5 percent
level. This is important because political accountability is
important to economic growth. However, there is a negative
coefficient (-0.0276172) between corruption and economic
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growth, which is what is expected from such study.
Corruption is negative and statistically significant with a pvalue of 0.002. This indicates that a 1 point increase in
corruption will decrease GDP by 2.76 percent which is
significant. Corruption affects economic growth by reducing
aid, foreign investment, and effectiveness in an economy.
Otenyo (2004) used Tanzania and Kenya as examples, where
Tanzania lost aid due to bureaucratic corruption and Kenya
lost a great deal of its competitiveness due to massive
corruption in the government. For many years, Kenya has
been among the worst performers on Transparency
International (TI) Corruption Perception Index (CPI) which
is the index employed in this study.
I expected investment in human capital to be positive
and statistically significant. Investment in human capital here
measured the net enrollment of primary education rate over a
10 year period, which is not enough to make a conclusive
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decision. The coefficient is negative (-0.007122) and
statically insignificant (p-value 0.088). As mentioned before,
Africa has some of the lowest levels of school enrollment in
the world.
Natural resources are measured as the percent of
exports that are a main mineral resource of each country.
African countries on average depend on primary product
exports (86 %) (Barbier, 2005). The results from this study
show a positive relationship between economic growth and
mineral resources. The coefficient is .0002286 and
statistically insignificant to economic growth with a p-value
of 0.258 at the 5 percent level.
IV.

Discussion
Many of the results presented in this study are

consistent with other economic studies. Globalization,
although positive for economic growth, is not significant in
Africa because globalization is not fully realized there. The
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main goal of this study has been to investigate the effect of
globalization relative to other traditional factors such as aid,
FDI, and trade on the economic growth of Sub-Saharan
Africa. The results indicate that globalization can positively
impact economic growth; however, it is not statistically
significant for all of Africa in this study. Many studies
conclude that the lack of economic growth in Africa is due to
marginalization of the world economy, lack of globalization,
heavy dependence on primary commodities and/or natural
resources, as well as weak technological capabilities. Thus,
African nations not fully integrated to the global economy.
Globalization can work in African nations if it is used to
promote embedded, decentralized, broad based trading
networks that bypass current trade patterns dominated by
transnational oligopolies and corrupt African elites
(Schneider, 2003).
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Globalization can be a catalyst for economic growth.
Most countries that are well off in Africa, such as the
Seychelles, are countries with little or no natural resources.
Botswana is a great example of a country in Sub-Saharan
Africa that did not fall victim to the natural resource curse
(or Dutch disease), but instead manages its natural resources
to its benefit. In essence, countries such as Botswana and
Seychelles have embraced and managed globalization. As
Schneider (2003) found in his study, in an effort to manage
globalization and diversify its economy, while fostering
greater global linkages for the benefit of its citizens: the
government of Botswana followed the classical neoliberal
recommendations for developing an economy. They
established an appropriately valued currency, political and
social stability, lowered wages, subsidized and taxed
financing and training, and provided good education and
infrastructure. They learned from the experience of South
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Korea because taxes and subsidies were accompanied by
requirements that firms employ at least 400 Botswana
workers, invest 25 percent of the project‘s capital, and export
most of what is produced (Schneider, 2003: 5). By
reinvesting wealth of natural resources in physical and
human capital, for instance, Botswana gained one of the
highest rates of primary and secondary-school enrollment
(Barbier, 2005). There are ways in which Africa might
benefit from globalization significantly, perhaps by taking
examples from Botswana, Seychelles or East Asian such as
South Korea, Taiwan, Singapore, and Hong Kong when it
comes to the process of globalization. However, policies that
are follwed need to be country-specific.
Most African countries export natural resources or
primary commodities which were conditions attached to
SAPs. This study shows that globalization is not important to
economic growth of countries with large amounts of natural
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resources. Sachs and Warner (1997) pointed out that high
resource abundance leads to increased aggregate demand that
shifts labor away from high learning-by-doing sectors and
thus depresses growth in labor productively. In other words,
natural resource production is less skill intensive than other
industries. Therefore, when countries open to trade, they
shift away from manufacturing, which requires skilled labor
to primary production which require less skilled labor.
Globalization does foster economic growth in manufacturing
and infrastructure, argued KS and Reinert (2005). However,
in most African countries, the manufacturing industries are
neglected. Instead, they import cheap manufactured goods
from Asia which undermined the industries at home.
Meagher (2003) also concluded that the flood of cheap Asian
manufactured goods imported via trans-border trading
circuits has crippled manufacturing industries throughout
West Africa. Another sector that has been neglected is the
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agricultural sector. Trans-border inflows of agricultural
commodities undermine the long-term viability of local
agriculture by undercutting prices and eroding demand, in
addition to undermining local food security and disrupting
agricultural development initiatives (Meagher, 2003). In
order for Africa to benefit from globalization it must
embrace other sectors such as agricultural and manufacturing
industries.
The result of FDI from this study found a negative
relationship. In economic literature, there are controversies
over the benefit of FDI. Some found a positive relationship,
others concluded that FDI enhances growth only under
certain conditions. For example, when the host country‘s
education exceeds a certain threshold, or the domestic and
foreign capital are complement, the country has achieved a
certain level of income, the country is open, or when the
country has a well developed financial sector (Asiedu, 2005).
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Other scholars found that FDI is largely driven by natural
resources and markets‘ sizes. This seems to be consistent in
Africa. The three largest recipients of FDI are Angola,
Nigeria, and South Africa. As mentioned above, private
investment that occurs in mineral resources is not beneficial
in the long run because it is not channeled to human capital
or infrastructure. Another problem regarding natural
resources in Africa that is not often discussed is that natural
resources are often owned and managed by foreign capital.
This is another reason why natural resources have not been
an engine for economic growth. Jomo K.S. and Erik Reinert
(2005: 124) argue that ―international capital flow (FDI) often
does not contribute to growth because they tend to be
primarily concentrated in enclave sectors, and in primary and
extractive industries that exacerbate the pattern of
comparative advantage.‖ They conclude that foreign capital
plays a positive role in economic growth when it goes into
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manufacturing and infrastructural sectors and not into
primary production sectors. In Africa, FDI often goes into
natural or primary resources, which do not play an important
role in economic growth.
In comparing developed countries to developing
countries, only 2 percent of national wealth is generated
through dependence on primary commodities, whereas for
developing countries dependent on export revenues from
primary commodities, about 20 percent of their national
wealth comprises natural resources (Barbier, 2005). Barbier
(2005) concluded that poor economies that can be classified
as highly resource-dependent in terms of primary product
exports also show low or stagnant growth rates. Thus, there
is more than enough evidence to show that resource
dependency may be associated with poorer economic
performance. In Africa, greater dependence on the
exploitation of natural resources appears to hinder economic
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growth. There are many other proposed hypotheses as to
why natural resource dependency hinders economic growth.
In Africa, this can be attributed to failed policies, weak
institutions, lack of well-defined property rights, insecurity
of contracts, corruption, and social instability (Easterly and
Levine, 1997; Warner and Sachs, 1997). However, other
economists propose that the problem might be due to a
failure to ensure that the rents generated from natural
resource extraction are reinvested in other forms of capital
such as those that are human, physical and knowledge-based
in order to sustain economic growth in resource-rich
countries, a phenomena known as the Hartwick rule
(Barbier, 2005).
Countries with natural resources, especially in Africa,
are prone to problems such as corruption, and thus are unable
to manage natural resource assets (and globalization)
efficiently in order to generate net benefits. This problem
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will continue to hinder economic performance. Figure 1
shows that countries with large amounts of natural resources
tend to be highly corrupt, with the exception of Botswana,
which is a unique case. There is a correlation between
natural resources and corruption. For example, Nigeria is a
nation with large amounts of natural resources, especially in
oil. Yet it is also one of the most corrupt countries in the
world. Countries such as Mauritius, which do not have a
large amount of natural resources, are less corrupt, highly
globalized, and have higher economic growth.
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Figure 1: Countries mineral exports in relation to the corruption (CPI)
index

Dreher (2003) concluded that globalization is good
for growth. He found that on average, countries that
globalize experience higher growth rates, especially
economically integrated countries. Thus, the accusation that
poverty prevails because of globalization is therefore not
valid, unless of course, globalization is not managed. On the
contrary, those countries with the lowest growth rates are
those that did not globalize. However, it is not enough to
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simply globalize in order to stimulate growth and reduce
poverty according to Dreher (2003). This study shows that
countries that are more globalized tend to be less corrupt and
countries that are less globalized are highly corrupt. This can
be seen in Figure 2 where the lower the number, the more
corrupt the country is, 1 being the most corrupts and 6 being
the least corrupt. On the globalization index, the higher the
number, the more globalized the country.
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Figure 2: Countries globalization index in relation to the corruption (CPI)
index
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Globalization is also a means to achieve good
governance. Otenyo (2004) concludes that the potential of
globalization as a catalyst in governance is an important
dimension in regional development. Due to corruption,
Africa has not excited western investors as other regions
have. Capital inflow remains low and so the total picture of
Africa‘s place in a globalizing world remains peripheral.
Easterly and Levine (1997) have empirically demonstrated
that economic growth is affected by the quality of
governance. Otenyo (2004) also stated that most data shows
a positive correlation between globalization and the rate of
attention to political accountability reforms. The results
from this study support this finding. Countries that are
globalized not only foster good governance, but attract trade,
investment, and tourism, which in turn generate greater
economic growth.
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Globalization is also meant to provide physical
infrastructure, technological support, and appropriate
incentives necessary for a country to grow in the long run.
One of the sad problems in Africa is that the most educated
and skilled individuals migrate to developed nations such as
the U.S.A, Canada, and the United Kingdom (Ajayi, 2003).
Globalization is a means of providing technology to Africa,
but this technology can only be successfully acquired,
utilized, and diffused if countries have developed sufficient
social absorptive capacity, such as human capital. Education
is therefore one of the keys to economic growth. Asia has
been publicized as the world‘s economic miracle, opening
and liberating trade regimes which have allowed these
countries to develop their comparative advantages and gain
access to newer and more appropriate technologies.
Financial liberalization has increased their access to
international private capital, not to mention more influence
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and power in the international economy (Ajayi, 2003). There
is much that Africa can learn from the Asia model, in
particular its development strategy. One of the investments
that have helped developed Asia is its investment in
education. Countries that are globalized tended to have
higher levels of education.
Globalization can significantly benefit Africa if
Africa positions itself appropriately via appropriate policy
measures. Like Asia, Africa needs to manage globalization
in order to benefit from it, instead of being managed by
globalization.
V.

Conclusion
This study concludes that although globalization is

not statistically significant to economic growth in SubSaharan Africa, it can have a positive influence on its
economic growth. Although the playing field in the
international economy is not level, African countries must
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take the necessary steps to reevaluate macroeconomic
policies and establish international institutions to better
manage and reap the net benefits of globalization. With good
governance, better institutions and sound and stable
macroeconomic policies, Africa can better manage its natural
resources, attract more capital inflow, and benefit greatly
from globalization.
Increased integration into the global economy can
provide Africa with newer and more efficient technologies to
build other industries such as agriculture and manufacturing,
and to reinvest natural resource revenues into these
industries. In addition, globalization can foster greater
investment in infrastructure, reduce corruption and improve
the rule of law, all of which are essential to economic
growth. Globalization can pressure nations to stay politically
moral, and develop better political and legal institutions.
Most economists strongly advocate globalization because of
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its positive net benefit to economic growth. Globalization
increases competition, fosters innovation and efficient
production, promotes education and infrastructure, but most
importantly encourages economic diversification. African
nations can follow the models of East Asia by diversifying
their economies and industries through reinvesting their
natural resource rents and revenues.
There is good evidence for further research in the
future. The model might suffer from the problem of panel
data regression. Increasing the number of years to greater
than 30 years would create more satisfactory results. Also, it
would yield better results to avoid some of the statistical
errors and include more variables. In addition, the study
would benefit by including more African countries perhaps
by comparing African globalization processes to those in
other regions of the world.

84

Reference:
1. Ajayi, Ibi S. 2003. ―Globalization and Africa.‖ Journal of
African Economies. Vol 12.supp 1: 120-150.
2. Asiedu, Elizabeth. 2005. ―Foreign Direct Investment in
Africa—The Role of Natural Resources, Market Size,
Government Policy, Institutions and Political Instability.‖
The UNU World Institute for Development Economics
Research. No. 24: 1-15.
3. Barbier, Edward B. 2005. Natural Resources and Economic
Development. New York. Cambridge University Press.
4. Dreher, Axel. 2006. ―IMF and Economic Growth: The
effects of Programs, Loans, and Compliance with
conditionality.‖World Development Vol. 34 No. 5: 769-788.
5. Dreher, Axel. (January 2003). ―Does Globalization Affect
Growth?,‖ University of Mannheim Working Paper. 1-33.
6. Easterly, William and Levine, Ross. 1997. ―Africa‘s Growth
Tragedy: Policies and Ethnic Divisions,‖ The Quarterly
Journal of Economics. 112 (4): 1203-1250.
7. Fayissa, Bichaka and Nsiah, Christian.
(February 2008).
―The Impact of Remittances on Economic Growth and
Development in Africa.‖ Department of Economics and
Finance: 1-19.
8. KS, Jomo and Reinert, Erik. 2005. The Origin of
Development Economics. New Delhi. Tulika Books.
9. Meagher, Kate. (March 2003). ―A Back Door to
Globalisation? Structural Adjustment, Globalisation &
Transborder Trade in West Africa.‖ Review of African
Political Economy Vol. 30.No. 95: 57-75.
85

10. Oshikoya, Temitope W. (January 2008). ―Nigeria in the
Global Economy.‖ Business Economics Vol. 43 Iss. 1: 3143.
11. Otenyo, Eric E. (June 2004). ―Local Governments
Connecting to the Global Economy: Globalization as
Catalyst in Government of East African Cities.‖ Public
Organization Review: a Global Journal. Vol. 4 Iss. 4: 339360.
12. Papanek, Gustav. (Jan.-Feb. 1973). ―Aid, Foreign Private
Investment, Savings, and Growth in Less Developed
Countries.‖ The Journal of Political Economy. Vol 81 No. 1:
120-130.
13. Schultz, Paul T. 1999. ―Health and Schooling Investments in
Africa.‖ Journal of Economic Perspectives. Vol. 13 No. 3:
67-88.
14. Sachs, Jeffrey D. and Warner, Andrew M. 1997. ―Natural
Resource Abundance and Economic Growth.‖ Center for
International Development and Harvard Institute for
International Development.
15. Schneider, Geoffrey E. (June 2003). ―Globalization and the
Poorest of the Poor: Global Integration and the
Development Process in Sub-Saharan Africa.‖Journal of
Economic Issues. Vol 37, Iss. 2: 389-96.

86

THE TREND OF THE GENDER WAGE GAP OVER
THE BUSINESS CYCLE
Nicholas J. Finio

Abstract
Even after the close of the first decade of the 21st
century, there is still significant gender bias in labor market
composition and compensation. As the events of the last two
years have proven, even drastic efforts of monetary and
fiscal policy have not tamed the business cycle. Previous
research has reached no definite conclusions on the effect of
business cycle trends on the gender wage gap. Over the
period from 1979:1 to 2009:3, it is found that increases in the
growth rate of GDP yield decreases in women‘s earnings
relative to men‘s, and it is also found that increases in the
unemployment rate yield increases in female earnings
relative to male. It is hypothesized that these significant
differences in compensation over the trend of the business
cycle correspond to inherent differences in the labor supply
curves of men and women.
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I. Introduction
In the post-war period, as women have entered the
workforce in the United States in ever greater numbers, they
have made substantial gains in earnings relative to their male
peers. However, by one metric, women are currently earning
only 80% of what men earn (BLS 2009). This can be
thought of as a 20% ―gender wage gap,‖ which has varied
extensively over the previous fifty years, with a general trend
of convergence to a smaller gap. For comparison, the wage
gap was around the 35-37% range through the 1960s and
early 1970s (O‘Neill 1983).
An extensive body of literature exists which
investigates the structural composition of this gender wage
gap, attributing the differences to skill premiums, sexual
discrimination, and various other factors. The goal of this
paper is not to analyze the determination of the wage gap,
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but to conduct a time-series analysis of the effect of the
business cycle in the United States on the gender wage gap.
The reason for conducting this analysis is
multifaceted. Foremost, the literature studying the effect of
the business cycle on the gender wage gap is inextensive,
and outdated. A new paradigm may have indeed developed
in labor markets over the past 15 years, since the last
substantive review of the impact of the business cycle on the
wage gap. The labor market in the US is still suffering from
the effects of the 2007-2009 global recession, with the
unemployment rate reaching, and only recently declining
from, a 10% level. Unemployment rates of this magnitude
have not been seen for a quarter century. Additionally, a
significant portion of the job loss during this recession has
come in the manufacturing, and construction industries, both
traditionally industries dominated by men (Kandil 2002).
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Given the significant structural shifts in the economy,
and dynamic factors in the labor market, there is reason to
believe that the gender wage gap may be significantly
shifting in the current period. Indeed, with the current
unemployment rate for men standing at 10.8%, and the
female rate standing at 8.3% (BLS 2009), it is difficult to
ignore speculation about the impact of such significant
differences in the male and female labor supply on relative
compensation.
In the following section I will describe several
methods of investigating the changes in the wage gap over
the business cycle, specifically with reference to O‘Neill,
and Kandil and Woods. Section III will detail my
methodology for approaching this topic from a new angle.
Section IV will discuss in detail the specificities of the data
used to conduct this analysis, and section V will present the
results of testing the model using the given data. I will then
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conclude with a summary and suggestions for policy and
further research.
II. Literature Review
As aforementioned, the existing literature discussing
the problem at hand is thorough, but outdated, and differing
in specifics from the planned approach herein. Two main
streams of thought, emerging from two specific papers, have
emerged from the work on the gender wage gap trend. First,
and most outdated, is the idea that business cycle
fluctuations adversely affect women in terms of wages.
Several authors have conversely found that male and female
labor supply curves are becoming more similar over time,
resulting in a general convergence of the wage gap; this
wage gap convergence is exaggerated by the business cycle.
June O‘Neill, publishing ―The Trend in the MaleFemale Wage Gap in the United States,‖ conducted a timeseries analysis, focusing on the effects of cyclical changes in
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unemployment in the wage gap. She theorized that business
cycle fluctuations in unemployment may affect the wage
rates of men and women differently for two reasons: (1)
women‘s wages are less likely to be covered by union wage
agreements than men‘s, which makes them more flexible,
which would increase female employment stability but widen
the wage gap during a recession (and opposite during an
expansion); (2) within industries and occupations, women
have less specific training, which results in greater
vulnerability during layoffs for female employees (O‘Neill
1985). O‘Neill found results that matched her expectations:
specifically that an increase in the unemployment rate caused
a decrease in the female-to-male earnings level, at a
statistically significant level.
Magda Kandil and Jeffrey Woods sought in 2002 to
extend the work of O‘Neill in their work ―Convergence of
the gender gap over the business cycle: a sectoral
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investigation,‖ with sectoral wage data from 1979:1 to
1993:4, and different theory. The authors theorize that men
do indeed have a relatively inelastic labor supply curve, due
to significant investment in training because of long-term
labor force obligations. This incentivizes men to endure
wage relative to employment fluctuations over time.
Females, who invest fewer years of experience and tenure in
the labor force relative to men, are caused to endure more
employment compared to wage fluctuations over the
business cycle. Given this framework, the authors expected
that the wage gap would widen significantly during
expansions, and shrink during contractionary periods (Kandil
2002). These expectations are contrary to those of O‘Neill.
Empirically, Kandil and Woods found evidence of
wage convergence with the business cycle in a majority of
the eight sectors. The gap between men‘s and women‘s
wages appears to be shrinking over time, due to a decline in
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responses of the hourly wage gap for males relative to
females during expansionary and contractionary demand
shocks. The authors assert that the labor supply curves of
the two genders are become more similar over time, resulting
in wage convergence over the business cycle (Kandil 2002).
Two additional international studies, one by Aller
and Arce in 2001, and one by Gupta, Oaxaca, and Smith in
2006 find similar empirical results, using similar theory to
that of the Kandil and Woods study.
III. Methodology
This econometric analysis seeks to answer the
following question: does the female-to-male earnings
differential expand or contract during business cycles? More
specifically, how do fluctuations in the growth rate of GDP,
and fluctuations in the unemployment rate affect the femaleto male earnings differential?
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Theory, as discussed, shows conflicting evidence for
the composition of the male-female earnings differential over
time as affected by the business cycle. Indeed, a brief
investigation of a scatter plot of the differential over time
(Figure 1) can show just how variable the wage gap
has been since 1979.
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Figure (1): The Gender Wage Gap over Time (Quarterly
Observations)
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This time series trend of the wage differential will be
used as a dependent variable in an OLS regression designed
to measure the impact of fluctuations in aggregate demand
and supply and labor demand and supply on the wage
differential. Specifically, the model will take the form of
Equation (1), below:
𝑌 = 𝛽1 + 𝛽2 ∆𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑡 + 𝛽3 ∆𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑡−1 + 𝛽4 ∆𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑡−2 + 𝛽5 𝑈𝑡
+ 𝛽6 𝑈𝑡−1 + 𝛽7 𝑈𝑡−2 + 𝛽8 𝑡 + 𝛽9 𝑡 2 + 𝜀
Where Y is the female-to-male wage differential, GDP is the
real level of GDP in the current quarter, U is the current
nominal unemployment rate, t is a time trend, and 𝜀 is a
stochastic error term. The current quarter in time is
represented by 𝑡, and previous quarters are represented by
𝑡 − 𝑛. In addition to the CLRM OLS regression that will be
conducted, the Prais-Winsten (Cochrane-Orcutt) iterated
autoregression will be utilized to correct for autocorrelation
in the error term.
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Theory suggests that wages are sticky, such that,
aggregate demand and supply shocks will not immediately
affect worker wages due to worker bargaining agreements.
This is the rationale for including lagged terms for the
change in GDP, as it is unreasonable to assume that GDP
growth in the current quarter determines the level of wages
in the current quarter. By similar reasoning, the current
unemployment rate will not influence the labor supply curve
and effect wages contemporaneously.
An augmented Dickey-Fuller test for stationarity on
the dependent variable leads to non rejection of the null
hypothesis of a unit root contained in the dependent variable.
The wage differential does not follow a stationary process.
Because of the non-stationarity of the dependent variable,
two time trends are included in the model: a linear term, and
a quadratic term. Results from the Dickey-Fuller test are
available in Table (1).
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Table (1). Dickey Fuller Test for Stationarity of the Femaleto-Male Wage Differential.
Dickey-Fuller test for unit root Number of observations =
122
---------- Interpolated Dickey-Fuller --------Test
1% Critical
5% Critical 10% Critical
Statistic
Value
Value
Value
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------Z(t)
-1.672
-3.503
-2.889
-2.579
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------MacKinnon approximate p-value for Z(t) = 0.4454

The model of the female-to-male wage differential is
designed to specifically analyze the impact of aggregate
economic shocks on it. These shocks are specifically limited
to aggregate demand, in the form of GDP growth, and labor
supply, in the form of the unemployment rate. Two time
trends are included to break the trends in the dependent
variable. Theory suggests two possibilities for empirical
results: namely, that the female-to-male wage differential
could increase during contractions (as empirically shown by
O‘Neill), or that the female-to-male wage differential could
decrease during contractions (as empirically shown by
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Kandil and Woods). Notably, O‘Neill did not include
measures of shocks to aggregate demand and supply, only
the unemployment rate as a measure of the business cycle.
Kandil and Woods did not include unemployment rates in
their analysis, only proxies for aggregate demand and
supply. Furthermore, the results of the most recent study
only date to 1993, resulting in an additional sixteen years of
time series data being available for study in regards to the
composition of the wage gap. In the next section, changes in
that data since 1993 will be discussed as they pertain to the
analysis.
Simultaneity bias is not an issue for the regressions at
hand; theory does not suggest that the wage gap‘s nominal
size has a causation effect on the growth rate of GDP or the
unemployment rate. There is no need for instrumentation or
two stage OLS correction of the model in its current
functional form.
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IV. Data
Ideal data for this time series regression would date
back to the second world war, when women began to enter
the ―official‖ workforce in significantly greater numbers. By
the nature of the gender wage gap itself, constructing data for
this analysis presents problems, as noted earlier in the
discussion of the non-stationarity of the wage gap dependent
variable. Because the rate of female participation in the
labor force has fluctuated greatly over time, results in any
given period may be significantly different from another.
Furthermore, the feminist movement, equal pay legislation,
and shifting cultural attitudes obviously have significant (and
difficult to quantify) effects on the wage differential. Given
these issues, a practical aggregate measure of wages was
selected.
The data on the gender wage gap was constructed
from the Bureau of Labor Statistic‘s Current Population
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Survey. Two time series dating back to 1979:1 and ranging
to 2009:3 were obtained, the seasonally adjusted median
usual weekly earnings (averaged by quarter), for each sex.
This series applies only to full-time workers, removing bias
of ratios of each sex that work part time to full time. From
these two series, the dependent variable in the model, the
female-to-male earnings ratio, was constructed. This was
done by dividing female earnings in each quarter by the
corresponding level of male earnings. Figure (1) in section
III illustrates the composition of the dependent variable over
time. As shown, the average wage differential, by quarter,
over the time period 1979:1 to 2009:3, was equal to 73.6%,
interpreted as women making that percentage of what men
make, on average. The values for the differential vary
widely over the 30 year period, ranging from nearly 60% to
above 80%.

101

The first independent variable in the equation is the
growth rate in GDP. The time series for this was obtained
from the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis‘ FRED online
database. The data takes the form of the seasonally adjusted
continuously compounded annual rate of change in real gross
domestic product. Two lagged terms of this variable were
created, dating back one quarter, and two quarters,
respectively.
Additionally, the unemployment rate is included as
an independent variable in the regression. This data was
obtained from the BLS‘s online database, consisting of the
seasonally adjusted quarterly unemployment rate, ranging
from 1979:1 to 2009:3. Two lagged terms were also created
for this variable. A table of summary statistics for all
included model variables is available below, in Table (2).
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Table (2): Variable Summary Statistics
Variable

Mean

Std. Dev.

Min

Max

𝑌
∆𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑡
∆𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑡−1
∆𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑡−2
𝑈𝑡
𝑈𝑡−1
𝑈𝑡−2
𝑡
𝑡2

.736
2.622
2.622
2.615
6.148
6.148
6.120
62
5104.667

.055
3.039
3.039
3.050
1.484
1.484
1.456
35.651
4653.386

.615
-8.3
-8.3
-8.3
3.9
3.9
3.9
1
1

.817
8.9
8.9
8.9
10.7
10.7
10.7
123
15129

#
Obs
123
123
123
122
123
123
122
123
123

V. Empirical Results
The following, Table (3) presents the results for the
OLS regression on Equation (1), as detailed in section III.
There are no statistical modifications to this model.
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Table (3).
Time-Series OLS Regression of the Gender Wage Gap,
1979:1 – 2009:3

∆𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑡
∆𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑡−1
∆𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑡−2
𝑈𝑡
𝑈𝑡−1
𝑈𝑡−2
𝑡
𝑡2
Constant
Observations
R-squared
* significant
at 5%
DurbinWatson
Statistic

𝑌
Coefficient
-0.001
-0.002
-0.001
-0.014
0.001
0.018
0.003
-0.000
0.591
121
0.96

Absolute value of t-statistic
(2.50)*
(3.12)*
(1.49)
(2.34)*
(0.07)
(3.08)*
(19.92)*
(9.71)*
(63.19)*

.911

When interpreting this regression it is first necessary to note
the presence of positive autocorrelation in the error term, as
evidenced by the Durbin-Watson statistic being of lower
value than its lower bound. This suggests a statistical
correction will be necessary for more robust results.
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Furthermore, a Breusch/Pagan test for heteroskedasticity
yields a p-value of .9283, indicating no rejection of the null
hypothesis of constant variance of the error term. However,
the regression coefficients can still be interpreted.
The Ramsey RESET test yielded a p-value of 0.000,
allowing rejection of the null hypothesis that there are
omitted independent variables of a squared or polynomial
form in the model specification. This result is consistent
with the structure of theoretical model of the behavior of the
wage gap, and it also fits with the inclusion of only a squared
term for time in the model.

Investigation of the variance

inflation factors, seen below in Table (4), necessitates some
discussion. There is some issue with multicollinearity in the
regression, especially due to the time series inclusion of lags
on macroeconomic variables. Furthermore, there is
significant multicollinearity between a variable and its
squared values. However, theory suggests that the inclusion
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of these variables is necessary, even given the high
multicollinearity; dropping any variables would lead to
specification bias.
Table (4): Variance Inflation Factors
Vari

∆𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑡∆𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑡−1
∆𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑡−2𝑈𝑡

𝑈𝑡−1 𝑈𝑡−2 𝑡

𝑡2

able
VIF

Me
an

2.3
1

2.40

1.76

74. 168

67. 25. 23. 45.

85

63

.93

82

38

89

The coefficient value on GDP and its one period lag
were both found to be statistically significant in difference
from zero, and negative. This supports the empirical results
of Kandil and Woods (2002), which also discovered that an
increase in GDP corresponds to an increase in the percentage
value of the female-male wage differential (i.e. the femaleto-male wage ratio would decrease).
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The coefficients on the current value of
unemployment, and the two-period lag value of
unemployment were both found to be statistically significant
in difference from zero. However, they took opposite signs,
with the current value of unemployment‘s coefficient
yielding a positive sign, suggesting that an increase in
unemployment will increase the value of the female-male
wage differential (as above with GDP). This supports the
empirical results of O‘Neill, 1985, who found the same.
However, as the coefficient on the two-period lag in
unemployment is also statistically significant in difference
from zero, it must be interpreted. It suggests that an increase
in unemployment, two quarters previously, will decrease the
value of the wage differential, which supports the
conclusions of Kandil and Woods, and Aller and Arce
(2001), which both found that the gender wage gap contracts
during recession.
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As predicted by the non-stationarity of the wage gap
over time, the included variables of time and time squared
both had statistically significant coefficients. This timeseries significance explains the high r2 value of the
regression, which is of little use for interpretation of the
model in this case. To correct for potential error, mostly due
to the detection of autocorrelated errors, the Prais-Winsten
iterated autoregressive estimates of the same regression
equation will be calculated. This regression will also utilize
robust standard errors, autocorrelation issues in the error
term. The results from this regression are presented below,
in Table (5).
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Table (5).
Prais-Winsten Autoregression of the Gender Wage Gap,
1979:1 – 2009:3, with robust errors
𝑌
Coefficient

Absolute value of t-statistic

-0.0004

(1.23)

∆𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑡−1

-0.0009

(2.38)*

∆𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑡−2

-0.0002

(0.76)

𝑈𝑡

-0.0066

(1.57)

𝑈𝑡−1

0.0000

(0.02)

𝑈𝑡−2

0.0108

(2.53)*

𝑡

0.0028

(11.84)*

𝑡2

-0.0000

(5.45)*

∆𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑡

Observations
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R-squared
* significant at 5%
Durbin-Watson
Statistic

0.91

2.31

First notable in the results of the AR(1) model is the
transformed Durbin-Watson statistic, which is not proof of
no autocorrelation, but significantly close to its upper bound
of no autocorrelation as to assume that autocorrelation is not
an issue here (especially when compared to the original
statistic of .91). Another method of testing for
autocorrelation is the runs test for patterns in the sign of the
109

error term. The runs test on the errors from the AR model
yields a rejection of the null hypothesis of non serially
random errors, indicating that autocorrelation is still present
(the runs can actually be seen in Figure (2)).
Investigation of the behavior of the residuals
for the AR(1) regression over the time period is still
warranted, and this can be observed in the scatter plot in
Figure (2), below.

-.04

-.02

Residuals

0

.02

Figure (2). AR(1) Regression Residuals.

1980

1990

2000

2010

Year
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The error term for the autoregressive does not appear
to be entirely stochastic in nature. At a quick glance, the
residuals appear to reflect the business cycle, to some extent.
However, although there appears to be a slight pattern in the
error term, the Durbin-Watson statistic does not yield
definite conclusions about autocorrelation. Further
investigation into this problem suggested utilizing
differencing of the dependent variable with the current RHS
variables: however, this method garnered no statistical
significance from zero of any RHS coefficient.
Accepting the issues with this regression as given,
interpretations of the coefficients can be made. For the GDP
coefficients, in this regression, only the one-quarter lagged
coefficient on GDP is deemed to have an effect statistically
significant in difference from zero, taking a negative value,
matching the results of the OLS model and supporting the
evidence from Kandil and Woods (2002). These results
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suggest that when there is a positive increase in the growth
rate of GDP in the previous quarter of one percent, there is a
.0004 increase in the percentage value of the gender wage
gap (i.e. it would increase from 20% to 20.0004%, or, in
terms of the regression model, the percentage of men‘s
wages women earn would drop from 80% to 79.9994%),
holding the influence of other included variables constant.
While the t-score on the non-lagged component of GDP‘s
coefficient has dropped, its sign has not changed, so
conclusions from the previous section about the impact of
GDP on the wage differential are not changed.
The only coefficient on unemployment that remains
statistically significant is the two-period lagged value, which
takes a positive coefficient again, as in the OLS regression.
This coefficient predicts a .0028% decrease in the value of
the gender wage gap for each increase in the unemployment
rate of 1%, holding the influence of other included variables
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constant. This supports the empirical work of Kandil and
Woods, and Arce and Aller, who found the gender wage gap
to contract during a recession. The negative coefficient on
the current value of unemployment is no longer statistically
significant in difference from zero, which indicates that the
results of O‘Neill are not supported by the autocorrelation
corrected regression. The coefficients on the time variables
remain statistically significant in difference from zero, as
predicted by theory.
VI. Conclusions
This investigation focused on the behavior of the
female-to-male wage differential in the aggregate US
economy over the period 1979:1 to 2009:3. An estimation of
the true gender wage gap was created from Current
Population Survey data, using median weekly earnings of
full time workers. The historical time series data shows
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significant variance in the wage gap over time. Stationarity
of the wage gap series was rejected.
Using traditional OLS methods, and autoregressive
methods, the wage gap was regressed on GDP growth and its
lags over two quarters, and the unemployment rate and its
lags over two quarters. Empirical evidence was found that
the gender wage gap expands during business cycle
expansions and contracts during recessions. Specifically:
when the growth rate of GDP is positive in previous quarters,
the value of female earnings decreases relative to men‘s;
when the unemployment rate increases in previous quarters,
the value of female earnings relative to men‘s increases.
Some of this empirical evidence conflicts with previous time
series analysis, however, this investigation includes an
additional 15 years of data compared to the most recent US
study.
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This evidence is at large consistent with theory
regarding the nature of the labor supply curves of women
and men. The greater experience, tenure, and bargaining
positions men hold due to their longer commitment on
average to the workforce (and possibly sex bias), compared
to their female peers, puts them in a position which enables
more wage gains during expansions (Blau 1997).
This paper was written to conduct further analysis of
an important topic that had not recently been studied. It can
be observed that the gender wage gap has been increasing
during the current recession (Figure 1). The empirical
findings of this paper, however, do not support the current
fluctuations in the data. The empirical findings suggest that
the large increases in the unemployment rate and decreases
in the GDP growth rate should have led to a decreased
gender wage gap; the data shows that the gender wage gap
has increased. However, the empirical findings do support
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the notion that it is crucial for women to increase their work
experience, and positions in labor agreements, in order to
hold the kind of wage bargaining power that men do.
Further investigation into this topic should undertake
a sectoral analysis of wages, similar to the study by Kandil
and Woods (2002), in order to analyze the different
components of the labor market. Although the results of
this paper support previous research, the current situation of
the wage gap does not reflect what has been empirically
shown. Additional time and data may be necessary in future
years to show the true effect of the 2007-2009 recession on
the composition of the gender wage gap.
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International Graduate Students
and U.S. Innovation
Svetoslav Semov4

ABSTRACT
This paper attempts to empirically evaluate the
contribution of international graduate students to U.S.
innovation. The main framework used is a simplified version
of the ―national ideas production function‖. Two
econometric specification are estimated – one in which a
time trend is incorporated to observe the short-term
relationship between the variables and one in which no time
trend is included with the goal of capturing the variables‘
long term equilibrium relationship. The results suggest hat in
the long-term the number of international graduate students
significantly (at the 10% level) affects innovative activity.
However, when the short-term relationship of the variables is
analyzed it is found that the effect of the foreign students is
negative and insignificant. This is attributed to the fixed size
of graduate programs in the short run and their tendency to
expand in the long-run.

4
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1. INTRODUCTION
Increases in unfavorable attitude toward immigrants are
often observed in the face of rising unemployment and quite
expectedly

–

in

the

face

of

threats

to

national

security.5International graduate students, the focus of this
paper, are not left unaffected. For example, since the 9/11
attacks applicants for student visas have been required to
have an interview at an American consulate.6 This has lead
to delays of several months in order to sit for an interview
that lasts a couple of minutes. Furthermore, new laws
mandated the tracking of foreign students, regulated the type
of research which they can perform and limited their access
to certain biological materials (Warwick, 2006).
Such events are particularly alarming given the
composition of US S&E doctoral graduates in recent years.

5

The most recent example is the Grassley-Sanders amendment, a part of the
recent fiscal stimulus package that restricted the ability of recipients of federal
money to hire high-skilled foreigners under the H-1B visa program.
6
Economist, 2004
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In 2000, for example, the foreign-born represented 39
percent of that group. Furthermore, according to the 2000
Census foreigners comprised 47 percent of the US S&E
workforce with a doctoral degree. Consequently, people
from academia have repeatedly warned that restrictions to
the number of foreign graduate student could lead to a crisis
in research and scholarship. 7
Economic theory suggests that there are a number of
ways that international graduate students could contribute to
US innovative activity and, in turn, to growth (Maskus et al.,
2006). First, that is done through their direct impact as
important inputs in university laboratories. International
graduate students both perform valuable research and offer
new ideas. Second, their publications and patents spill over
to the broader economy by becoming knowledge for firms
7

In 2004, Lawrence Summers warned Colin Powell, then secretary of state, that
the decline of foreign students threatens the quality of research coming from US
universities (Financial Times, April 8, 2004).
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and inventors. Last but not least, scientific discoveries with
participation of international graduate students are frequently
turned into licensing arrangements for applied product
development.
This paper tries to analyze the role of international
graduate students in expanding US innovation. It was
primarily motivated by the existence of a number of studies
arriving at contradicting results when analyzing the
contribution of international graduate students to US
innovation. For example, an empirical study by Challeraj et
al found that a 10% increase in the number of foreign
graduate students would raise patent applications by
4.5%.8In contrast, Borjas concluded that international
students displace native ones and, therefore, might not
contribute to innovation (2004).

8

Note that patenting activity is the most commonly used proxy in innovation
studies (Trajtenberg, 1990). The reasons for that are explained in the Data
section below.
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The current analysis tries to reconcile the previous
contradicting results on the subject by attributing their
inconsistency to the different effect of international graduate
students on innovation in the long- and short- terms. Hunt
made a similar observation concerning skilled immigrants‘
influence on US innovation (2008). The author demonstrated
that any potential crowd-out effects dissipate when the
period of analysis extends over ten years. Undoubtedly, a
potential finding indicating that foreign graduate students
positively affect US innovation in the long term will have
huge implications for immigration policy and it will allow
for a more careful evaluation of shocks to the number of
international graduate students as the one described above.
Five sections follow. The first reviews related literature
on the contribution of international graduate students to
innovation. The second describes the econometric model that
will be used. The third displays the data sources used. The
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fourth analyzes the statistical and economic results obtained
for the effect of international graduate students on US
innovation. The last section summarizes the findings and
makes some public policy recommendations.

II. LITERATURE REVIEW
There are two related strands of literature that help build
the foundation for this paper: one discusses the contribution
of skilled-immigrants to innovation and the other does so for
international graduate students. Most of the issues and
methodology used in both research areas are quite similar. In
both cases the main question of interest is whether skilledimmigration/international graduate students have a positive
impact of innovation. In both cases a certain possibility for a
crowd-out effect exists in which domestic workers/students
are displaced. An overview of some of the results already
obtained follows.
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As usually done in the literature Kerr et al. use
patenting as a proxy for innovation (2008)9. Since each
patent provides the name of the inventors, the authors use a
name-matching algorithm that detects the ethnicity of the
inventor. The dependent variable is the log of overall patents
by city. The key explanatory variables are the log of the total
number of patents by Indian and Chinese inventors. The
focus is on the patenting of these two ethnicities because
they play a disproportionate role in the H1-B program. The
results show that a 10% growth in the H1-B worker
population is associated with a 2% increase in patenting.
Furthermore, the authors estimate that a 10% increase in the
H1-B population is associated with a 0.5%-1% increase in
English

invention,

suggesting

a

crowding-in

effect.

9

Note that patenting activity is the most commonly used proxy in innovation
studies (Trajtenberg, 1990). The reasons for that are explained in the Data
section below.
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However, that estimate is not statistically significantly
different from zero.
By exploring individual patenting behavior as well as
state-level determinants of patenting, Hunt demonstrates the
important boost to innovation by skilled immigrants (2008).
Again U.S. patents are used as a proxy for innovation. For
the individual-level analysis a probit for the probability of
having a patent granted is estimated. The main variable of
interest is a dummy variable for the foreign-born. The results
indicate that immigrants that are working in S&E are 1.4
percentage points more likely to have a patent than domestic
workers in S&E. The state-level analysis uses the share of
the state‘s workforce composed of skilled natives and
immigrants as a dependent variable and the share of skilled
immigrants as the main independent variable. A coefficient
of zero on the independent variable would indicate that there
is a crowd-out effect as an increase in the number of skilled
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immigrant would be offset by a decrease in the number of
skilled natives. The author finds that using ten-year
differences leads to a small, but statistically insignificant
crowd-out effect. Furthermore, Hunt observes that when the
length of differences increases, the crowd-out disappears.
The coefficient is 0.95 for 50-year differences. This suggests
that any potential crowd-out effects disappear in the longterm.
A paper by Chellaraj tries to simultaneously estimate
the effects of both groups (skilled immigrants and
international graduate students) on innovation. Chellaraj et
al. claim that the presence of foreign graduate students has a
positive and significant impact on US patent applications and
grants awarded to both firms and universities, meaning that
international graduate students contribute to US innovation
(2008). However, the authors also estimate that skilled
immigration, while having a positive impact on innovation,
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is not statistically significant from zero. The model used to
account for the role of foreign students is a modified
―national ideas production function‖. Further details on the
model are provided below.
A slightly different approach is used by Stuen et al.
(2008). The authors explore the contribution of foreign
science and engineering students to the creation of new
knowledge in the U.S. economy. They estimate the impact of
foreign and domestic graduate students on the publications
of 2300 science and engineering departments at 100 large
American universities from 1973 to 1998. They use fixed
effects for each field for each university. The authors‘ results
suggest that the relative contribution of foreigners and
Americans appear to depend on the type of foreign student.
Overall, the marginal foreign student is neither clearly better
nor clearly worse than the American one. Foreign students
contribute more in terms of citations at the elite universities.
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However, there are significant variations in the marginal
productivity of students across source regions.
Levin and Stephan assert that foreign-born scientists
play a disproportionate role in generating knowledge in the
USA (1999). They look at six illustrative criteria to evaluate
contributions to US science: individuals elected to the
National Academy of Sciences and/or National Academy of
Engineering, authors of citation classics, authors of hot
papers, the 250 most-cited authors, authors of highly cited
patents, and scientists who have played a key role in
launching biotechnology firms. For each indicator of
scientific achievement they determine whether the observed
frequency by birth (or educational) origin was significantly
different from the frequency one would expect given the
composition of the scientific labor force in the United States.
The authors used a ―goodness of fit‖ test by computing the
chi-square statistics. Only in the instance of hot papers in the
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life sciences were they not able to reject the null hypothesis
that the proportion was not the same as that in the underlying
population. This means that according to the authors foreign
graduate students contribute to US science and therefore to
innovation.
Borjas implicitly disputes the findings of Chellaraj et
al and Levin and Stephan (2005). He claims that foreign
students crowd out native ones from graduate programs. He
suggests that there might be two types of a crowd-out effect.
The first one is within a particular university. The enrollment
of an additional foreign student would imply that one fewer
native student would be enrolled. The second type of crowdout effect concerns the incentives natives have to pursue
those educational programs where foreign students cluster.
Such a cluster might indicate lower wages in that particular
occupation, making natives avoid the program. Borjas
focuses on the first type of crowd-out effect. He empirically
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verifies that foreign students limit the opportunities available
to white men in graduate education, especially at the most
elite universities. However, the author admits that the
implications of his finding vary on what happens to the
displaced white men and to the foreign students after they
graduate – questions without a definite answer.
Using a similar approach to Chellaraj‘s this paper
attempts to unify the contradicting claims about international
graduate students made in the existing literature. In other
words, it tries to explain why some studies imply a positive
relationship between international graduate students and US
innovation and why others imply a negative one. Just as
Hunt‘s analysis demonstrated the different impact of skilled
immigrants on innovation in the different time periods, this
paper tries to do so for international graduate students. An
attempt is made to find an explanation that compromises the
positive findings of Chellaraj et al and Levin and Stephan on
130

one hand and the negative ones by Borjasand Stuen et al on
the other hand. In particular, the negative correlation
between international graduate students and innovation is
interpreted as the short-term effects of those students on
innovation, while the positive relationship is seen as the true
long-term connection between the two. The two timehorizons are empirically estimated.
III. MODELING
The contribution of international graduate students to
US innovation can be only estimated on the background of
some general framework aiming at explaining innovation.
Usually the model used to estimate innovative activity is the
widely recognized ―national ideas production function‖
(Porter and Stern, 2001; Stern et al., 2002)10:
𝜙

𝜆
At=δ(𝐻𝑡𝐼𝑁𝐹 𝐻𝑡𝐶𝐿𝑈𝑆 𝐻𝑡𝐿𝐼𝑁𝐾 )𝐻𝐴,𝑡
𝐴𝑡 (a version of the

model used by Porter and Stern).
10

Note that most of the models described in the Literature Review section use
some simplified version of this model.
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This framework suggest that the rate of new ideas
production is a function of the total capital and labor
𝜆
resources devoted to the ideas sector of the economy - 𝐻𝐴,𝑡
,

the total stock of knowledge held by an economy at a given
𝜙

point in time – 𝐴𝑡 , the level of resource commitment and
policy choices that make up the innovation infrastructure –
(𝐻𝑡𝐼𝑁𝐹 ), the environment for innovation in the country‘s
industrial clusters – 𝐻𝑡𝐶𝐿𝑈𝑆 and the strength of linkages
between the common infrastructure and the industrial
𝜙

clusters – 𝐻𝑡𝐿𝐼𝑁𝐾 . According to Porter and Stern (2001) 𝐴𝑡 ,
𝜆
𝐻𝐴,𝑡
and 𝐻𝑡𝐼𝑁𝐹 are fairly easy to quantify. However, the

environment for innovation and the linkages between the
common innovation infrastructure and the industrial clusters
are hard to measure directly.
Because of the limitations outlined above and
because of the focus placed on one particular factor in
determining innovative activity – the number of international
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graduate students – a fairly simplified model is offered. It
attempts to capture on one hand the effect of international
graduate students and on the other all other relevant factors
listed above. The model used is an autoregressive process:
𝜆𝐹
At=At-1𝐻𝐴,𝑡
.

In other words, innovative activity in time period t is
represented as a function of innovation in the previous time
𝜆𝐹
period and the flow of international graduate students, 𝐻𝐴,𝑡
.

Note that At-1 is used to proxy all other factors from above 𝜙

𝜆
𝐻𝑡𝐼𝑁𝐹 , 𝐻𝑡𝐶𝐿𝑈𝑆 , 𝐻𝑡𝐿𝐼𝑁𝐾 , 𝐴𝑡 and 𝐻𝐴,𝑡
. It should also be observed

that under the model described above (the Porter and Stern
version), the number of international graduate students is
supposed to be implicitly incorporated into the labor and
𝜆
capital resources devoted to the ideas sector – 𝐻𝐴,𝑡
. Here it is

separated as the goal is to evaluate its individual impact.
Before the model outlined above could be estimated
econometrically, it must be accounted for the time difference
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between the variables in the model. New ideas production
will be measured by total patent applications as a percentage
of the labor force. Since there is a lag of five years between
the usage of the inputs in the idea production function and
the application for a patent, the number of international
graduate students will have a five year lag with respect to
patent applications (Popp et al. 2004). Furthermore, the
number of international graduate students is taken as a
proportion of the total number of graduate students in order
to account for any changes in the overall size of the graduate
programs. In its general form the econometric model used
looks like:
PALFt = α + λF*IGTGt + α1*PALFt-1+εt
The dependent variable, patenting activity, is the
most

commonly

used

(Trajtenberg, 1990).

proxy

in

innovation

studies

Patents are a reasonable proxy for

innovation, because they reflect novelty and economic value
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as exhibited by the fact that it is hard and expensive to obtain
a patent. Using the lagged dependent variable as a regressor
is not too unreasonable. As explained above there are many
independent variables that are hard to capture directly and in
this way it can be at least partially accounted for them.
Furthermore, previous inventions help the creation of current
inventions and therefore should be included in the model
(Porter and Stern, 2000). Also, previous innovative activity
is a manifestation of past inputs, which accumulate over time
to determine current innovation.
Because this is a time –series estimation, the
stationarity of the variables must be taken into account. Two
econometric specifications are estimated – one in which a
time trend is incorporated to observe the short-term
relationship between the variables and one in which no time
trend is included with the goal of capturing the variables‘
long term equilibrium relationship. The last could be
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performed because the two variables of interest – patent
applications and international graduate students – are
cointegrated. They share similar stochastic trends. The
resulting econometric specifications are as follows:
PALFt = α + λF*IGTGt + α1*PALFt-1+εt
PALFt=β +λF1*IGTGt + β1*PALFt-1+θ1*t+εt.
As already deliberated, the impact of international
students on innovation has been differently evaluated using
different methodologies. Levin and Stephan estimate that
foreign-born scientists play a disproportionate role in
generating knowledge in the USA (1999). This is confirmed
by the assertion that a 10% increase in the number of foreign
graduate students would raise patent applications by 5%
(Chellaraj, 2008). However, as mentioned before, there are
some studies saying that foreign students crowd out native
white students from graduate programs, where the effect is
biggest in the most elite institutions (Borjas, 2005).
136

Using the two economic specifications above the aim
is to evaluate what the impact of international graduate
students is. That depends on the signs of the coefficients λF
andλF1. While the coefficient in the long-term equilibrium
relationship, λF, is expected to have a positive sign, the one
in the de-trended version, λF1, could have either a positive or
a negative value. This is because the short-term impact of
international graduate students is not so clear – there might
be a short term crowding-out effect that is later eliminated as
graduate programs expand (Freeman, 2005). Such a crowdout effect may mean that an increase in the number of
foreign graduate students does not contribute to innovation at
least in the short run.
IV. DATA
As already explained, patenting activity, is the most
commonly used proxy in innovation studies (Trajtenberg,
1990). There are two important reasons suggesting that
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patents are indeed a reasonable proxy for innovation. First, to
be awarded a patent, a certain invention must be novel,
meaning that patents indeed capture new ideas. Second, it is
quite costly to apply for a patent – this suggests that the
patenting entity must believe that there is some economic
value associated to its patent. There are many pitfalls in
using patenting activity as a proxy for innovation – not all
inventions are patentable, not all inventions are patented and
the inventions that are patented differ significantly in value
(Griliches, 1984). Nevertheless, patenting activity is the best
available measure (Trajtenberg, 1990). Data on patents
awarded to different institutions was gathered from the
website of the US Patent and Trademark Office.
Another measurement limitation is reflected in the
variable IGTG. In the model employed here IGTG is the
fraction of international graduate students to total graduate
students. The innovation literature (Porter and Stern, 2001)
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says that the resources devoted to R&D sector are an
important input in the innovation function. That would mean
that only the part of international graduate students that
specializes in the sciences should be included. However,
such data is unavailable. Consequently, the total number of
international graduate students is used. This is not an overrestrictive assumption, as the number of international
graduate students in the sciences and engineering is about
eighty percent. Figures on international graduate students
were obtained from Open Doors, the publication of Institute
for International Education.
The two economic specifications outlined above are
estimated over the period 1969 - 2003. Below is a table with
the basic statistical properties of the variables:
Variable Obs
IGTG
L.PALF
PALF

Mean
St. Dev. Min
Max
37 8.411081 2.164665
4.61
11.97
35 1.565074 0.648049 0.936836 2.981165
35 1.565074 0.648049 0.936836 2.981165

V. EVIDENCE
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A. The Long Term Equilibrium Specification
Estimating the first specification resulted in a model
that had the following coefficients and significance of the
variables:
Long Term Equilibrium Specification
Coefficient t-statitic P-value
IGTG
0.0223345
2
0.054
L.PALF
0.9962844
25.53
0.000
_cons
-0.123392
-2.26
0.031
Adj R-squared = 0.9876

The model did not pass the Breusch-Pagan test for
heteroskedasticity. The null hypothesis that the variance of
the error terms is constant was rejected, because the P-value
of the chi-square statistic equaled 0.0446, which is rejected
at the 5 % level of significance. After correcting for the
problem of heteroskedasticity, the following values were
obtained from the regression with robust standard errors for
the coefficients and the significance of the variables:
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Long Term Equilibrium Specification
Variable Coefficient t-statitic P-value
IGTG
0.0223345
1.94
0.062
L.PALF
0.9962844
21.68
0.000
_cons
-0.123392
-3.26
0.003
Adj R-squared = 0.9884

It was also found that the model is the appropriate
functional form as it passes the Ramsey‘s test. The nullhypothesis that there are no omitted variables is failed to be
rejected, as the P-value of the F-statistic equals 0.4048. It is
also ascertained that the model does not suffer from
autocorrelation. The Durbin-Watson test has a statistic of
1.841373, which in a model with three estimated parameters
and

33

observations

is

in

the

acceptable

region.

Multicollinearity was also not observed – the mean VIF was
3.44.Moreover, the model seems accurate as the coefficient
of the L.PALF is positive and very significant – it has a Pvalue of 0.000, which means that the null-hypothesis that the
coefficient is equal to zero is rejected. This is just as
expected. Also, it should be noted that the adjusted R141

squared is very high – 0.9884, suggesting that the model is a
good fit. The test for overall significance of the model is
confirming that the independent variables are jointly
significant. The F-statistic is very high - 1283.64.
It can be seen that the coefficient of IGTG is positive.
As expected, it is less significant than before the correction
for heteroskedasticity, but the null hypothesis that it is equal
to zero is still rejected at the 10% level of significance. The
interpretation of this coefficient is that for every percentage
point increase in the ratio of international graduate to total
graduate students, the ratio of patent applications to the labor
force increases by approximately 0.02 percentage points.
This means that in the long-term the presence of
international graduate students is exerting a positive impact
on US innovation.
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B. Specification with De-trended Variables
Estimating the second specification resulted in a
model with the following coefficients and significance of
variables:
De-trended Version
Variable Coefficient t-statitic P-value
IGTG
-0.0210377
-0.95
0.35
L.PALF
0.9304208
19.72
0.000
_cons
0.0874489
0.81
0.425
Adj R-squared = 0.9890

The model did not pass the Breusch-Pagan test for
heteroskedasticity. The null hypothesis that the variance of
the error terms is constant was rejected, because the P-value
of the chi-square statistic equaled 0.0084, which is rejected
at the 5 % level of significance. Therefore, it was corrected
for the problem of heteroskedasticity and the following
values were obtained from the regression with robust
standard errors for the coefficients and the significance of the
variables:
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De-trended Version
Variable Coefficient t-statitic P-value
IGTG
-0.0210377
-0.86
0.398
L.PALF
0.9304208
20.01
0.000
time
0.013332
2.44
0.021
_cons
0.0874489
0.81
0.425
Adj R-squared = 0.9901

It was found that the model has the appropriate
functional form as it passes the Ramsey‘s test. The nullhypothesis that there are no omitted variables is not rejected,
because the P-value of the F-statistic equals 0.4881. It was
also ascertained that the model does not suffer from
autocorrelation. The Durbin-Watson test has a statistic of
1.841373, which in a model with four estimated parameters
and 33 observations is in the acceptable region. Moreover,
the model seems accurate as the coefficient of the L.PALF is
positive and very significant – it has a P-value of 0.000,
which means that the null-hypothesis that the coefficient is
equal to zero is rejected. This is just as expected. Also, it
should be noted that the adjusted R-squared is very high –
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0.9901, suggesting that the model is a good fit. The test for
overall significance of the model is confirming that the
independent variables are jointly significant. The F-statistic
is very high - 850.23.
This time the coefficient of IGTG is negative.
Furthermore, it is not significant as it has a P-value of 0.398.
Therefore, the null hypothesis that the coefficient is different
from zero is not rejected. This means that as we de-trend the
variables, that is, as we capture their short-term relationship,
the effect of international graduate students on innovation
becomes negative and insignificant.

C. Summary of Results
In summary, as we compare the two econometric
specifications we find out that in the long-term the number
of international graduate students significantly (at the 10%
level) affects innovative activity. However, when the short145

term relationship of the variables is analyzed it is found that
the effect of the variable of interest is negative and
insignificant. The last could be due to the fact that in the
short-run the size of a particular university‘s student body is
fixed and accepting one additional foreign student would
mean not accepting a domestic student. The former could be
explained by the expansion of graduate programs in the longrun. Such an expansion allows for the accommodation of
more

international

graduate

students

without

the

displacement of domestic ones.
In light of the results obtained, it is quite expected
that a concentration on the short-term and university-level
would lead to the observance of a negative relationship
(Borjas, 2005). Furthermore, a concentration on the longterm and national-level would lead to the observance of a
positive relationship (Chellaraj, 2008).
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VI. CONCLUSIONS
This paper attempted to unify the contradicting
studies existing so far in the literature about the contribution
of international graduate students to US innovation. It tried
to explain why some studies implied a positive relationship
between international graduate students and US innovation,
while others suggested a negative one.
Two econometric specifications were estimated – one
in which a time trend was incorporated to observe the shortterm relationship between the variables and one in which no
time trend was included with the goal of capturing the
variables‘ long term equilibrium relationship. The results
suggested that in the long-term the number of international
graduate students significantly (at the 10% level) affects
innovative

activity.

However,

when

the

short-term

relationship of the variables was analyzed it was found that
the effect of the variable of interest is negative and
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insignificant. This was attributed to the fixed size of graduate
programs in the short run and their tendency to expand in the
long-run.
Further research on the subject could improve the
model by adding more variables. In its current version the
analysis employs a simplistic auto-regressive form with two
variables. Furthermore, more observations could be added as
this was a time series model that had only a single
observation per year. This could be achieved if a model that
implements some form of the ideas production function at
the sate-level is used. 11
As already suggested, the findings of this paper have
significant immigration policy implications (Maskus, 2007).
First, graduate enrollments at domestic universities in
technical fields should be increasingly made more open to
foreign students. Second, investment into excellent research
11

Such a model was utilized by Hunt in estimating the impact of high-skilled
immigrants on US innovation (2008).
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facilities should be made a priority in order to attract the
increasingly global pool of science and engineering students.
Third, international graduate students in S&E should be
placed on an accelerated track to citizenship.
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